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Introduction
Social assistance payments (SAP) or "welfare benefits" seems to be a double-edged sword. Those who receive SAP only do so, as they are otherwise unable to provide for themselves, either through long-term unemployment, inability to accumulate work-related entitlements or some sort of health disability etc. However, at the same time, for the marginal potential SAP recipient, incentives to work are also negatively affected. In some constellations (in Europe, especially when the main earner is not well educated and many children are present in the household), the difference between full time wages from employment and SAP receipt (Lohnabstand ) is minimal (ISG, 2006) reducing incentives for work. Furthermore, there have been discussions in the public and the press about the absolute level of minimum existence, triggered by a controversial study that showed that as little as ¤132 2 but no more than ¤278 per month (excluding rent, heat and electricity payments) would be sufficient instead of the ¤347 that one would currently receive as a healthy single male SAP recipient (Thiessen and Fischer, 2008) . They specifically cited that expenditure patterns for food, household items and clothing were very similar to that of the general population and in no way represented a minimum existence, but rather an average existence.
While this study has specifically looked at the needs of (male) adults and therefore has triggered a discussion on their needs, another discussion on the level of payments to children for unemployed people receiving Hartz IV (since 2005 unemployment assistance and social assistance for employable people have been combined to Arbeitslosengeld II on a level effectively similar to the level of the former SAPthe former standard rate of SAP had been lower than Arbeitslosengeld II but had the possibility of one-off payments for special needs) has been risen since the Federal Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) has found these payments to be unconstitutional on January 27, 2009. Setting the payments for all children between age 0 and 14 to 60% (¤211) of the standard rate of adults (¤351) would violate the constitutional principle of equality (Gleichheitsgrundsatz ), because contrary to the determination 2 It should be remembered that at the time of the study (2008) , the German state paid between ¤154 and ¤179 per child and month in the form of child benefits (Kindergeld ). Thus, suggesting that an adult could subsist on ¤132 is clearly a low estimate in the literature.
of the standard rate for adults, the court found that the needs for children had not been explicitly defined and determined. Furthermore, the fact that the level of payments is the same for all children between the ages 0 to 14 would ignore differing needs for children of different ages.
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These two controversial discussions reflect that (i) there is still no public consensus as to the actual level of a socially acceptable minimum existence, (ii) there might be incentives not to work for certain groups of people at given levels of social transfer payments and (iii) payments to different groups of needy persons (adults vs. children) might be afflicted with different levels of stigma and social jealousy which we will employ to show the robustness of our results. Given that the state or in the end the tax payer has to pay for these transfers, the general question arises how these transfers are actually valued by the people, first of all, obviously by those who receive the payments and second, by those who finance them. Answering these questions is not straightforward because for SAP recipients, the payments lead on the one hand to securing their living, but on the other hand, these people are also afflicted with stigma costs 4 which is often forgotten in the debate. For the second group of people, the non-takers, SAP may be soothing comfort in uncertain times, but also worrying because someone, namely those working, has to finance the SAP system in the end.
Hence this paper tries to examine SAP from a different angle in that it explicitly tries to gain insight as to how different kinds of people actually value these payments. Since 1962 there have been many exogenous changes in the SAP structure over time as well as between federal states. We examine the role of the potential SAP in determining the utility that is gained from it by takers and non-takers which we approximate using questions regarding subjective self-evaluated life satisfaction which builds on a strand of literature that has recently become very popular and wellacknowledged in welfare economics. To illustrate the robustness of the results, we additionally control for a common non-stigmatizing transfer, namely child benefits
(Kindergeld ) and demonstrate that while SAP remains negative and significant for life satisfaction, child benefits transfers for households with children are seen to be positive and significant.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides background information on the literature with respect to subjective wellbeing, SAP and child benefit receipt.
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Section 3 describes the data used and the econometric analysis and discussion. Section 4 draws conclusions.
Backround
Previous studies have tried to investigate why there seems to be a high non-take up behaviour in Germany and have attributed this at least partly to stigma effects 5 .
Similar to Riphahn (2001) who uses EVS data 6 , Frick and Groh-Samberg (2007) using SOEP data for example, regress SAP take-up on several proxies for utility derived from SAP 7 (in the sense of "degree of needs" and "duration of needs") and proxies for claiming costs. They assert that education, gender, migration status and level of urbanisation are proxies for claiming costs 8 . In this sense, they postulate for example that social norms for males are different than for females which should be reflected in higher non-take up rates for males if stigma plays a role. The estimated coefficients for the needs proxies perform as expected: the coefficients are in general positive indicating that higher need result in higher take-up rates. Controlling for selection results in negative (significant) coefficients for low education and living in a rural area indicating that stigma might play a role in explaining the puzzle of high non-take up rates.
There are also other international studies trying to explain take-up behaviour mainly in the UK and USA. While there are several theoretical papers (such as Yaniv, 1997) , other papers present empirical tests of their theoretical models (such as Moffitt, 1983 and Blundell, Fry, and Walker, 1988) . All of these papers argue that stigma might play a significant role in take-up behaviour. While these international studies try to explain international take-up behaviour, many of the German studies examine the 5 Frick and Groh-Samberg (2007) argue that a substantial portion of non-take up behaviour can be explained by "rational poverty", meaning that for households who are just below the eligibility threshold, the costs of claiming often exceed the utility from claiming. 6 A federal consumer expenditure survey. 7 Families with children are assumed to have a higher utility because of the responsibility of providing good care for the children. 8 Other characteristics that are used for proxies are household structure (single parents, families or pensioner household), region (East or West Germany), attitudes towards social security and degree of regional concentration of SAP recipients.
topic only in a descriptive manner (for an overview see Riphahn, 2001 ). (Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004) . There has been a high level of empirical support (not only by applied economists, but also by psychologists, especially in the early stages of this strand of literature) for the validity of these life satisfaction questions as measuring utility which has made the economic concept of happiness so popular, notwithstanding the critique of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) . The potential for new insights of this research has been demonstrated by a large empirical literature (for income effects of wellbeing see Clark, Frijters, and Shields, 2006; Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields, 2004a ,b and for unemployment Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998 , Clark and Oswald, 1994 and Kassenboehmer and HaiskenDeNew, 2009 ).
Here we use this line of research by investigating the effect of SAP payments on well-being, using life satisfaction as a measure for well-being, which has not been 8 done before in connection with SAP. This allows us to gain new insights about the value of SAP payments but also about potential negative externalities.
Until 2004 in Germany, short-term unemployed persons received unemployment insurance (Arbeitslosengeld later to be called Arbeitslosengeld I ), whereas long-term unemployed persons could only receive unemployment assistance payments (Arbeitslosenhilfe) at a substantially lower rate. Even lower were the payments made to those receiving SAP, i.e. those not having worked long enough or never having worked to be entitled to employment related benefits. Since 2005, those employable persons previously having received unemployment assistance have been put at the same levels of payments of those receiving SAP. Accordingly those previously receiving unemployment assistance and currently able-bodied, receive "Arbeitslosengeld II" or "Hartz IV" at effectively the same rate as those who are not able-bodied
(not able to work due to some impairment), i.e. the SAP recipients (the former standard rate of SAP had been lower than Arbeitslosengeld II but had the possibility of one-off payments for special needs). 1982, 1991, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2002 . In 1996, the regular maximum age of benefit receipt was raised from 16 to 18 years of age. Benefits were also allowed if the child was older than 16, unemployed and looking for work until the age of 18. This was later extended to 18-21 in 1996. Potentially, parents of a child in full time post-secondary learning could receive benefits until the child turned 27. (2007), Kornstad and Thoresen (2004) . In our analysis, we will offer evidence for the robustness of our results in that we compare the effects of child benefit payments to the effects of simple SAP transfers.
Empirical Application
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the longest running 9 The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2. (2004) we will ultimately use fixed effects panel regression (linear and binary logit) without substantial loss of ordinal interpretability (allowing us to avoid using the conditional ordered logit model as in Chamberlain (1980) to estimate the following life satisfaction (LS) regression:
where X it is a vector of usual time-varying control variables (unemployment dummy, out-of-labour force dummy, married dummy, impact dummies for separation, divorce, spouse dying and child being born last year), degree of physical disability, quadratic in age, years of education, and household composition. All income and SAP variables are logged, equivalized (divided by the square root of the household size), monthly and deflated real (in 2000 EUR) measures.
Coefficient (c) refers to the household specific real log net income. The coefficient (d ) refers to the administrative value entitlement for SAP, given the household structure, the year and federal state, i.e. the potential "outside option" of how much persons
Hahn (2006) In a second model, we control additionally for a non-stigmatizing transfer, namely child benefits (Kindergeld ) with coefficient (h). If SAP transfers are indeed especially stigmatizing, then SAP should remain negative and significant, while the coefficient on child benefits should be at least zero/insignificant or positive and significant, given that all indications suggest the "social acceptability" of child benefits. We calculate the household-specific child benefit, taking into account ages and number of the children, own income of the children and region.
The and similarly an income source derived from SAP receipt which is coded as a 0-1 dummy. This implies running the regression (1) and (2) with all information in time t except for the variables associated with the coefficients c and e which are at time t-1. This introduces an obvious error for which there is no obvious easy correction. Table 1 
Model (1), Case (I) -Most recent income and SAP takeup information
In Table 3, are statistically different from each other, even using 2 full standard deviations for the confidence interval.
Next we examine for case (I) the same model specification using the conditional (binary) logit estimator with person-specific fixed-effects (FECL). We find very similar results, with all focus variables having similar magnitudes, identical signs and almost identical standard errors. We lose some observations as compared to the FEP, as the FECL estimator removes all observations in which the dependent does not vary (i.e. all persons in which they have never deviated from the person-specific mean).
Because FECL is a non-linear model, we use a non-linear combination 11 of (c), (d ) and (e) can however no longer be differentiated from zero and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This implies, that although there is a positive elasticity of income on life satisfaction of (0.177 / 6.92) = 0.0263, the linear combination of (d ) and (e) at (-0.163 -0.020) / 6.92 = -0.0264 completely offsets this, producing a zero net effect (taking into account standard errors of the coefficients). Thus by using this measure of income and SAP receipt, the stigma effect is 100%! To explain this idea, we increase SAP. For those takers, this increases their income by the same amount that SAP entitlement increases. However, as seen by the coefficients in column 3, the positive effect of (c) is completely offset by the sum of the negative effects of (d ) and (e). For those non takers, there is a social jealousy effect of (d ).
Using data from case (II), only when own earned income increases over and above the subsistence level as provided by the SAP, does a person experience an increase in life satisfaction. This has serious policy implications, as it makes it clear that the general European policy of smoothing income by providing assistance or benefit payments as opposed to the general Anglo-Saxon method of creating strong incentives for re-entry into the labor market by such schemes as the American Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) etc, has dire negative externalities, that have otherwise been overlooked. Simply increasing SAP for takers leaves their life satisfaction completely unchanged, due to offsetting stigma or shame effects. The situation is even more critical for non-takers. Their relative income position is eroded compared to those receiving SAP and receive a strong negative effect, which we interpret as social jealousy. For the non takers, the social jealousy effect is so large, that it is effectively as if the additional SAP amount were taken from their income, euro for euro.
Examining column 4 of Table 3 , we compare the coefficients for case (II) using the One explanation for the much smaller income effects using these income indicators in case (II) may be the time dimension. It could be that the income from the previous year has a much smaller (but not zero) effect as compared to income from the current time period income. However the negative effects of the SAP receipt interaction are almost identical, comparing columns 1 through 4 for coefficient (e).
Model (2) Controlling for non-stigmatizing transfers, Child Benefits
A potential criticism of the method used is that the SAP Entitlement may be capturing other phenomena than what we originally had intended. We expand our analysis to Model 2, in which we additionally control for child benefits (Kindergeld ). In a similar manner, we control for log equivalized real child benefit transfers in addition to the SAP transfers. As such, for these controls, we lose about half of the sample, as we can only include observations in which some child benefit is actually paid (due to the log form of the variable as is standard in the literature). Thus necessarily we have only households in which at least one child is present and would receive benefits (some "adult" children themselves earn a sufficiently high amount that child benefits are no longer paid to their parents). We then are forced to remove one variable in a dummy set controlling for number of children in the household to make the (omitted) reference category "one child in household".
At no time would we expect the coefficient (h) to be significantly negative, as there 
Conclusions
Over the past 25 years, Germany has more than doubled the share of social assistance recipients, currently at some 3.5% on average. Although this share is not particularly large, it has constantly been the subject of public concern. The city states of Bremen, Berlin and Hamburg have had traditionally high levels, even as much as 10% over this period. During this time there have been several exogenous reforms in benefit levels for SAP. This paper calculates the counterfactual administrative amount that a household would receive if it were a SAP recipient without any outside resources. The level of benefits varies not only predominantly by changing definitions of household composition, but also by federal state and year and is largely exogenous to the household.
This paper analyzed the effect of SAP levels on personal life satisfaction, using two different concepts of household net income and SAP take up within the German SOEP. Keeping one's own income constant, increases in the SAP Entitlement reduce significantly life satisfaction. In fact, the absolute level of the negative effect of SAP (whether one receives it or not) is around 50%-100% of the positive effect of one's own income. We call this phenomenon "social jealousy". For those actually receiving SAP, their levels of "stigma" or "shame" are significantly even higher and are affected even more negatively by increases in SAP. Thus the potential monetary welfare gain to those receiving SAP must in some way be discounted by the substantial loss due to social jealousy experienced by SAP recipient and non-recipients alike. Clearly it is in the best interest of policy makers to reduce welfare leakage due to negative externalities like social jealousy and stigma.
We tested the stability of the SAP transfer results by examining another largely used program, namely child benefits (Kindergeld ). Here we see that the results for the SAP if anything are strengthened by the additional control variable. SAP transfers are seen to be decreasing life satisfaction in the form of social jealousy and stigma, whereas child benefits exhibit clear positive externalities over and above a pure income effect, just as one would expect from a stigma-free social program.
These findings have large implications for social policy, as clearly the focus of German social policy should be towards increasing employability, (re-)integrating or (re-)introducing adults to employment, such that they are able to provide more for themselves. Programs such as the EITC in the Unites States, which provide benefits only for those who work, are a step in the right direction. The reliance on SAP has clear negative externalities for those who receive it (in the form of "stigma") and those who finance it (in the form of "social jealousy"). Depending on the model used, only income earned over and above the subsistence level actually increases life satisfaction. This would imply that simply relying on policies geared 20 toward marginal employment, producing subsistence level incomes provide little or no welfare enhancement as measured by life satisfaction. While this study makes no specific recommendation for a "correct" or "optimal" minimum existence, it does shed light on the dramatic negative externalities of social policy, borne by recipients and non-recipients alike, which must be taken into consideration when examining the "true costs" for such a policy. 
